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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner,
Supreme Court No. 900238

vs.
GREGORY J. MARSHALL,

Court of Appeals No. 890121-CA
Respondent.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The Court of Appeals in the Amended Marshall

conclude that State

v. Schlosser,

Utah case law and Schlosser

opinion did not

11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) overruled prior

did not overrule prior Utah decisions.

2. The Court of Appeal's ruling that the Petitioner is precluded from raising
the standing issue for the first time on appeal is supported by the controlling
United State Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court's decisions.
3. The decisions of other cases purportedly representing a majority view are
not disposivitive of this case, nor controlling case law.
4. The Court of Appeals did erroneously conclude that the trial court's
findings on consent to search were insufficient. However, the Court of Appeals did
not establish a clear and convincing standard of proof on the issue of consent.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS AMENDED OPINION IN
STATE V. MARSHALL
DID NOT CONCLUDE THAT STATE V.
SCHLOSSER
OVERRULED PRIOR UTAH CASE LAW.
The Petitioner, in its Petition for Certiorari, maintains that the Court of
Appeals overruled prior Utah case law in ruling standing cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. (See, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8.) The Petitioner
has misread the Opinion. Careful scrutiny of the language employed by the Court
of Appeals in its application of Schlosser,
verifies that Schlosser

and particularly the standing issue,

is the undisputed controlling rule of law on this issue.

Petition is really asking this Court to overturn
In discussing Schlosser
v. Constantino,

Schlosser.

in light of predecessor standing cases; to wit, State

732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987) and State v. Iacono,

725 P.2d 1375

(Utah 1986), the Court note:
[i]n these earlier cases, it is sometimes unclear whether the Utah
Supreme Court raised the issue of standing sua sponte on appeal or
permitted the state to raise the issue of standing for the first time on
appeal. We assume that Schlosser supersedes these earlier cases
and thus do not follow them. (Emphasis added)
State

v. Marshall,

132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) n. 6 at 51.

The Petitioner asserts this language means the Court of Appeals overruled
earlier case law on the important issue of standing. Neither Justice Stewart, in the
majority opinion in Schlosser,

nor Justice Howe, in his vigorous dissent,

addressed the two cases cited by the Petitioner. Justice Billings, in the Amended
Marshall

Opinion, attached hereto as Exhibit "A", uses the word "supersedes".

2

A more definitive explanation of what the Court of Appeals did in the Amended
Opinion is "distinguish" Schlosser

from the earlier cases. As Justice Billings

illustrated, it was "sometimes unclear", in the earlier cases, how the issue of
standing arose. Additionally, standing was not a dispositive issue in those cases.
From the Amended Opinion, it is clear that she viewed Schlosser

as the clearest

dispositive case on this issue. It is this clarity which created the difference in
Schlosser

as it does in the instant matter.

A review of both State

v. Constantino,

supra, and State

v.

Iacono,

supra, illustrates that, in neither case, was the standing issue found by the court
to be dispositive. In State v. Constantino,

supra, the motion to suppress was

made at the beginning of the trial and denied. There was apparently no prior
opportunity or necessity for either party to develop the issues in the lower court.
The opinion does not indicate whether or not the defendant's expectation of
privacy was raised for the first time on appeal. Similarly, in State

v.

Iacono,

supra, the defendant conceded, by affirmative testimony offered at time of trial,
that he did not have an expectation of privacy in the area searched.
circumstance is found in State v. Valdez,
in Iacono,

A like

689 P.2d 1134 (Utah 1984), where, as

the defendant conceded his expectation of privacy.

Petitioner's assertions that these cases were wrongly overruled by
and the appellate court in the Amended Marshall

Schlosser

Opinion are without merit.

These are the types of cases which Justice Billings declared, not overruled, but
distinguishable from Schlosser

and

Marshall.

Additionally, in the course of the string citation which Petitioner employs

3

on page 10 of the Petition for Certiorari, Petitioner cites, among others:
of Professional

J ournalists,

1987), Terracor

v. Utah Board of State

(Utah 1986) and Utah Restaurant

Utah Chapter

v. Bullock,

Lands

Association

Society

743 P.2d 1166 (Utah

and Forestry,

716 P.2d 796

v. Davis Board of Health,

709

P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985) as examples of the prior case law which this Court has
purportedly overruled in the Amended Marshall
cases.

Opinion. These are all civil

"Standing", in a civil context, is not the same type of standing in the

Constitutional context of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
Constitution

or Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

States

Therefore,

those cases are not dispositive of the rule of law on Fourteenth Amendment
"standing". Additionally, in civil cases where the standing of the plaintiff is in
question, it is plaintiff's burden, in the lower court, to proceed and establish it.
This is clearly not the burden in a criminal case, where it standing is, as noted by
the court akin to an affirmative defense.
The Petitioner's position is an erroneous one, in that Schlosser has not
overruled existing case law, but is, rather, the first case of this Court which clearly
outlines the rule of law on this issue. The Court of Appeal's logic and ruling on
raising standing for the first time on appeal is appropriate and a Writ of Certiorari
should not be granted for review of the opinion.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEAL'S RULING THAT THE APPELLEE IS
PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THE STANDING ISSUE FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL IS SUPPORTED BY THE
CONTROLLING UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND
UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

4

The Court of Appeals relied on State

v. Schlosser,

114 P.2d 1132 (Utah

1989) to find that new issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This
premise is thoroughly grounded in case law. As vigorously argued by Respondent
before the appellate court, there are a number of both legal and equitable reasons
why a defendant should not be forced to respond to issues on the appellate level
which were not raised below. As stated by this Court in the Marshall

opinion:

[w]e believe the Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to protect the
defendant from being required to deal with new legal issues on appeal
when he had no warning of the necessity to develop the relevant facts
below.
State

v. Marshall,

132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) at 49.

This position is supported in the United States Supreme Court Steagald
United

States,

v.

451 U.S. 204 (1981). In that case, as cited at page 48 of the

Amended Marshall

Opinion, the United States Supreme Court refused to allow

the government to raise the issue of Fourth Amendment standing for the first time
on appeal to enable it to provide an alternative ground to sustain the trial court's
refusal to grant a motion to suppress. The Court is also directed to a line of cases
which support the proposition that new issues cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal by either party. Mascar
Messer,

v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987), Lane v.

731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986), Bundy v. Century

P.2d 754 (Utah 1984), and Traynor
Similarly, in Brown

v. United

v. Cushing,

States,

Equipment,

Inc., 692

688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984).

411 U.S. 223 (1973), the United States

Supreme Court declared that if the issue of standing is not raised, then it is
deemed to be waived.
By taking the above-stated position, the Petitioner is asking this Court to
5

establish a double standard between plaintiffs and defendants in search and
seizure cases. The standard which the Petitioner urges this Court to adopt would
allow the plaintiff Government, in this genre of cases, to raise new issues for the
first time on appeal, while denying that right to the defendant. Such a standard
would surely be in violation of the equal protection of the due process provisions
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution

and Article 1 Section 4 and Article 1 Section 2 of the Utah Constitution.

This

is not the type of law which this Court should consider making.
The Court of Appeals' ruling that the Petitioner cannot raise new issues for
the first time on appeal was correct. The United States Supreme Court cases and
State

v. Schlosser,

are controlling.
POINT III

THE COURT OF APPEAL'S INTERPRETATION OF
STANDING REQUIREMENTS WAS CORRECT.
As argued hereinabove the other Utah cases relied upon by Petitioner are
not dispositive.

The Federal cases and cases from other jurisdictions the

Petitioner claims represent the majority rule are not controlling.

This Court

should therefore affirm the decision on this issue and deny the Petition.
POINT IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDE
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ON CONSENT TO
SEARCH WERE INSUFFICIENT. HOWEVER THE COURT OF
APPEALS DID NOT ESTABLISH A NEW CLEAR AND
CONVINCING STANDARD OF PROOF ON THE ISSUE OF
CONSENT.
The Respondent agrees with the Petitioner on the limited issue that the trial
court's findings were sufficient for appellate review in this matter. {See Petition
6

for Writ of Certiorari at 18). The record establishes the court's original findings
were erroneous. The Respondent's Cross-Petition, which lays out the sufficiency
argument and its rationale, is clear on this subject. The Court should and can
examine this issue based only on the Cross-Petition.
However, the Petitioner further asserts that the Court of Appeals erred by
creating a clear and convincing standard for proof of consent. (See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 19). The opinion reveals that no new standard was created
and Petitioner misread the language therein. Citing United

States

v.

Abbott,

546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977) the Court ruled:
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977), the
Tenth Circuit outlined the specifics necessary for the government to
sustain its burden to show that voluntary consent was given:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the
consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and
intelligently given"; (2) the government must prove
consent was given without duress or coercion, express or
implied; and (3) the courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and there must be convincing
evidence that such rights were waived.
Id. at 885. (quoting Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10
Cir. 1962)). See also United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448,
1453 (10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback,
621
P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
State

v. Marshall,

132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) at 49.

This language does not purport to create a clear and convincing standard by which
the evidence must be measured. It only outlines that any consent given must
clearly be voluntary.
The record in the lower court clearly establishes the State failed to prove
7

any consent to search the trunk or bags applying the applicable case law, even by
a preponderance. Based thereon, there is no legal reason to review the issue of
consent through Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari. A finding that consent was
not established can be made by granting Cross-Petitioner's Petition.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals decision on raising the issue of standing at the
appellate level was correct and does not require review. Applicable case law from
the United States Supreme Court and from this jurisdiction establishes that the
standing rule applied by the appellate court was in compliance with controlling
case law. The record establishes that consent has not been proven by any legal
standard. The Petition for Certiorari should therefore be denied and this Court
should limit its review to a determination of the issues set forth in the
Respondent's Cross-Petition.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ f r d a y of June, 1990.

MOONEY & ASSOCIATES

JEriROLDvD. McPHEE
Attorney for Respondent

KRISTINE K. SMITH
Attorney for Respondent
236 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 364-5635
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R. Paul Van Dam (3312)
Attorney General
Christine Soltis (3039)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol Building
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Telephone: (801) 538-1135
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EXHIBIT "A

There was no agreement by the Joan Cingolani plaintiffs to redeposit their shares with the
district court in the event the Anna Cingolani
plaintiffs successfully challenged the judgment
and order of distribution on appeal, and there
was no agreement by the Anna Cingolani
plaintiffs to do the same if the Joan Cingolani
plaintiffs successfully challenged the judgment
and order of distribution in their appeal. With
regard to the attorney fee claim, Anna and
GWWB did not seek a stay of the September
22, 1988, order distributing one-third of the
Joan Cingolani plaintiffs' recovery to HLP.
Instead, Anna .and GWWB acquiesced in the
clerk's disbursement of the full contingent fee
to HLP in accordance with Judge Harding's
order and did not obtain any agreement from
HLP to redeposit those funds with the district
court if Anna prevailed in this court on the
attorney fee distribution claim.
As a result of these actions by the parties
and Anna's counsel, the issues raised in both
appeals are moot. There is no longer any settlement money on deposit with the clerk of the
district court, and there is no basis on which
either the trial court or a party successful on
appeal could compel the other party's return
of the disbursed funds to the district court for
redistribution. In short, even if we were to
agree with one of the appellants on the settlement distribution claim or with Anna and
GWWB on the attorney fee distribution claim,
we could not afford any relief to the successful appellant. See Black, 656 P.2d at 410.
Appellants have not raised, and we do not
perceive, any issues of public interest, see
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah
1981), or any other extraordinary circumstances constituting an exception to the mootness
doctrine, see Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. at
33, that would justify our consideration of the
merits of these moot appeals. We therefore
dismiss both appeals, with the parties to bear
their own costs.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
John Fair Larson, Judge
1. John Fair Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sitting
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989).
2. Although technically an appellee in both cases,
Utah Power & Light Company is not an active
participant in either appeal because the two groups
of appellants are fighting with each other over the
distribution of the settlement to which all appellants
agreed.

Cite as

132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45
IN THE
U T A H COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Gregory MARSHALL,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890121-CA
FILED: April 18, 1990
Seventh District, Sevier County
Honorable Don V. Tibbs
ATTORNEYS:
Jerold D. McPhee and Kristine K. Smith, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and
Jackson.
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal
AMENDED OPINION*
BILLINGS, Judge:
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall ("Mr.
Marshair), was charged with possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute for value, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8
(1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pretrial motion to
suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized
from the rental car he was driving when he
was arrested. The trial court denied Mr.
Marshall's motion and he filed this interlocutory appeal. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure
of the contraband in detail as the legal issues
presented are fact sensitive. State v. Sierra,
754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery
("Trooper Avery") was chiving on Interstate
70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Marshall's vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a
motor home. Trooper Avery observed that
Mr. Marshall's turn signal remained blinking
for approximately two miles after he passed
the motor home. Not knowing whether Mr.
Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the
signal on, Trooper Avery pulled the vehicle
over to inform Mr. Marshall of the problem
and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper
Avery had issued similar warning citations for
turn signal violations approximately five to ten
times in the previous six-month period.

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall, Trooper
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Avery noticed the vehicle had California
"[W]e
will not disturb the trial court's
license plates. He approached Mr. Marshall's
factual
evaluation
underlying its decision to
vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn
signal problem. Mr. Marshall responded that grant or deny a motion to suppress unless it is
he had been having "a hard time keeping the clearly erroneous.'' State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d
972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State
thing turned off."
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); State
driver's license and vehicle registration. Mr. v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct.
Marshall produced a New York driver's App. 1989). Further, "[t]he trial court's
license and a California rental agreement for finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against
the vehicle. Mr. Marshall said he was going the clear weight of the evidence or if [the
skiing in Denver and planned to return the car appellate courtj reachfes] a definite and firm
to San Diego, California. However, the rental conviction that a mistake has been made." State
agreement indicated that the car would be v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
returned in New York in five days.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c)
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became
suspicious that Mr. Marshall might be trans- requires the trial court to state its findings on
porting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr. the record "[wjhere factual issues are involved
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car in determining a motion." Those findings must
where he issued a warning citation for "Lights, be sufficiently detailed in order to allow us the
to adequately review the decision
head, tail, other." Trooper Avery then retu- opportunity
1
below.
rned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the
rental agreement.
PRETEXT STOP
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper
he was carrying alcohol, drugs or firearms. Avery used the fact that his turn signal was
Mr. Marshall stated he was not. Trooper malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his vehicle
Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could to search for evidence of drug trafficking.
"look inside the vehicle." Mr. Marshall respThe protective shield of the fourth amendonded, "Go ahead." Trooper Avery and Mr. ment applies when an officer stops an autoMarshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's mobile on the highway and detains its occupvehicle. The passenger door was locked'and ants. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah
Mr. Marshall reached in on the driver's side Ct. App. 1988). A police officer may constitto open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a utionally stop a dtizen on two alternative
small red bag on the floor of the vehicle' and grounds. First, the stop "could be based on
asked if he could open it. Mr. Marshall specific, articulable facts which, together with
agreed. No contraband was found inside the rational inferences drawn from those facts,
bag or the passenger compartment of the would lead a reasonable person to conclude
vehicle.
[defendant] had committed or was about to
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall commit a crime." Id. (dting Terry v. Ohio,
had a key to the trunk and if Mr. Marshall 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Christensen,
would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall attempted 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Truto open the trunk, but was shaking so badly jillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)).
that Trooper Avery had to assist him by Second, the police officer can "stop an autoholding the key latch cover up while Mr. mobile for a traffic violation committed in the
Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw officer's presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977.
four padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall However, an officer may not use a traffic
opened the trunk. Trooper Avery asked Mr. violation stop as a pretext to search for evidMarshall what the suitcases contained and Mr. ence of a more serious crime. Id.
Marshall responded "clothes." Trooper'Avery
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr.
then asked if he could look in the suitcases. Marshall's vehicle to investigate his hunch
Mr. Marshall immediately reversed his state- that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved in
ment and responded that the suitcases were drug trafficking, we determine whether a
not his and must have already been in the hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the
trunk when he rented the vehide. Trooper totality of the circumstances confronting him
Avery testified there was some play in the or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to
zipper of one bag and he unzipped it far issue a warning for failing to terminate a turn
enough to see a green leafy substance. Trooper signal. Id. at 978.
Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for possesMr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop
sion of a controlled substance.
ofJus vehide is similar to the stop we found
Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any unconstitutional In ~5/erra. "We disagree.^In
evidence to contradict*Trooper Avery's testi- Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was
mony during the hearing below.
that the driver remained in the left lane too
long after passing a car. In this case, Trooper

Avery perceived an equipment problem with
Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to
turn it off.2 Courts consistently have held that
a police officer can stop a vehicle when he or
she believes the vehicle's safety equipment is
not functioning properly. 3
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra,
Trooper Avery was not suspicious of Mr.
Marshall for other reasons before the stop,
had not followed him in order to find some
reason to pull him over, and, before the
alleged violation occurred, had not radioed for
help thereby "indicating* ne intended to stop the
vehicle.
In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's
stop of Mr. Marshall's vehicle was not a
pretext, but was a valid exercise of police
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's
vehicle was functioning properly.
UNREASONABLE DETENTION
Next, Mr. Marshall complains that the
extent of his detention and the scope of
Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded constitutional limits.4
"[I]n determining whether the seizure and
search were 'unreasonable' our inquiry is a
dual one—whether the officer's action was
justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1968).
We have previously found that Trooper
Avery's traffic stop of Mr. Marshall was
justified. The remaining question is whether
Trooper Avery's subsequent detention and
questioning of Mr. Marshall was reasonably
related to the initial traffic stop or was justified because Trooper Avery had a reasonable
suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was engaged
in a more serious crime. United States v.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir,
1988).
The United States Supreme Court has not
chosen to define a bright-line rule as to the
acceptable length of a detention because
"common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria." United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
The Court has chosen to focus, not on the
length of the detention alone, but on "whether
the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicions quickly, during which time it
was necessary to detain the defendant." Id. at
686.
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning citation within ten minutes of stopping Mr.
Marshall and then returned Mr. Marshall's
driver's license and the vehicle rental agreement. Trooper Avery claims that as a result of
his examination of Mr. Marshall's driver's
license and the vehicle rental agreement and

his brief conversation with Mr. Marshall, he
became suspicious that Mr. Marshall was
involved in drug trafficking. Specifically,
Trooper Avery points to the fact that Mr.
Marshall produced a New York driver's
license and a California rental agreement for
the vehicle. When questioned about the rental
agreement, Mr. Marshall said he was going
skiing in Colorado and planned to return the
car to San Diego, California. However, the
rental agreement indicated the car was to be
returned to New York in five days, the approximate time it takes to drive directly from
California to New York. In addition,' Mr.
Marshall was driving along a well-known
drug trafficking route.
As a result of his suspicion, Trooper Avery
then asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying
weapons, alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Mr.
Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper
Avery allegedly asked for permission to look
into the vehicle and received Mr. Marshall's
consent.
The trial judge found that Trooper Avery's
"investigation was reasonable in view of the
defendant's statements in regards to the
vehicle ownership and the driver's usage. The
destination itinerary would have put a reasonable officer on notice that something was
wrong." Although not directly so stating, the
judge, in substance, concluded that Trooper
Avery had reasonable suspicion to believe that
Mr. Marshall was involved in illegal conduct.
Although it is a close call, we agree with the
trial court's assessment of the reasonableness
of the detention.
We find that Trooper Avery's questioning
of Mr. Marshall as to conduct unrelated to the
traffic stop was justified because he had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was
engaged in a more serious crime. See Guzman,
864F.2datl519.
In conclusion, based on the totality of the
circumstances, we agree with the trial court
that Trooper Avery's ten-minute detention
and brief questioning of Mr. Marshall prior to
Mr. Marshall's alleged consent to search the
vehicle was not an unreasonable detention.
SEARCH
On appeal, Mr. Marshall argues that even if
his initial stop and subsequent detention were
not constitutionally deficient, the subsequent
search of the trunk of the vehicle and the
suitcases found in the trunk without a warrant
violated his fourth amendment rights. The
state contends, on the other hand, that Mr.
Marshall consented to the search of the trunk
and abandoned any privacy interest in the
suitcases and thus Trooper Avery's search of
the suitcases was constitutionally permissible.5
In our prior opinion, we focused solely on
whether the search of the suitcases was proper.
We found the warrantless search of the suitcases unconstitutional as we refused to allow
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the state to raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time on appeal. We
granted the state's petition for rehearing to reexamine the related fourth amendment issues
of voluntary consent and abandonment which
are central to a resolution of this appeal.
1. Standing
The state, in its original brief on appeal,
claimed Mr. Marshall was without standing to
challenge the seizure of the suitcases as he had
disclaimed any ownership or possessory interest in the suitcases during the search and thus
had no expectation of privacy in their contents. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 13850 (1978); State v. Valdcz, 689 P.2d 1334,
1335 (Utah 1984); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d
70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v.
DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). The state relies upon the following
testimony from the preliminary hearing:
Q. [Defense Counsel] And what
was inside the trunk?
A. [Trooper Avery] There were
four suitcases.
Q. Did you ask if you could look
in those suitcases?
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of
all, I asked him what was in the
suitcases, and he told me, right
quickly, clothes. Then when I
looked at him again, he told me
that he didn't know where they
came from, they must have been in
there when he rented the car.
In our prior opinion, we relied on the Utah
Supreme Court decision of State v. Schlosser,
11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), which squarely
held that standing to challenge the validity of
a search under the fourth amendment "is not a
jurisdictional doctrine [but] is a substantive
doctrine that identifies those who may assert
rights against unlawful searches and seizures."
Id. at 1138. Citing the general rule that a
substantive issue or "claim of error cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal," the
supreme court deemed the issue of standing
waived. Id. at 1138-39.
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser,
claiming that in that case the state not only
failed to raise the issue of standing in the
motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal
and that here, unlike Schlosser, the state raises
standing simply as an alternative ground to
uphold the trial court's denial of the motion
to suppress.6 We do not find the distinction
determinative.7
< The United States Supreme Court took the
same position in Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204 (1981), when it refused to allow the
government to raise the issue of fourth amendment standing for the first time on appeal
to provide an alternative ground to sustain the
trial court's , refusal <to grant a motion to
suppress. The Court concluded:

Aside from arguing that a search
warrant was not constitutionally
required, the Government was initially entitled to defend against
petitioner's charge of an unlawful
search by asserting that petitioner
lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the searched home, or
that he consented to the search, or
that exigent circumstances justified
the entry. The
Government,
however, may lose its right to raise
factual issues of this sort before this
Court when it has made contrary
assertions in the courts below, when
it has acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts, or when it has
failed to raise such questions in a
timely fashion during the litigation.
Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
The state, on petition for rehearing, contends that language in Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978) is contrary to our conclusion
that the state should not be allowed to raise
standing for the first time on appeal. We disagree. The language in Rakas relied upon by
the state is consistent with our view.
The proponent of a motion to
suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the
challenged search or seizure. The prosecutor argued that petitioners
lacked standing to challenge the
search because they did not own the
rifle, the shells or the automobile. Petitioners
did not contest
the
factual predicates of the prosecutor's argument and instead, simply
stated that they were not required
to prove ownership to object to the
search. - The prosecutor's argument
gave - petitioners notice that they
were to be put to their proof on any
issue as to which they had the
burden, and because of their failure
to assert ownership, we must
assume, for purposes of our review,
that petitioners do not own the rifle
or the shells.
Id. at 130 n.l (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
We agree Avith the state and Rakas that Mr.
Marshall has the ultimate burden of proof to
establish that his fourth amendment rights
were violated or, to put it otherwise, that he
had an expectation of privacy in the area
searched or the articles seized.9 Nevertheless,
warrantless' searches are per se unreasonable
and the burden is on the state, in the first
instance, to show that a warrantless search is
lawful. State v. Opistcnsen, 676 P.2d 408; 411
(Utah 1984).
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We believe Rakas is consistent with our view
that the prosecutor, as part of the state's
burden to establish the constitutionality of a
warrantless search, must give a defendant
"notice that he will be put to his proof" on the
issue of fourth amendment standing. This can
be done at any time during the hearing on a
defendant's motion to suppress as long as the
defendant has an opportunity to put on evidence to meet the claim.9 Once the defendant
has been put on notice that the state claims
the warrantless search was constitutional
because he has no expectation of privacy in
the area searched, then the defendant must
factually demonstrate that he does have standing to contest the warrantless search. We
believe the Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to protect the defendant from being
required to deal with new legal issues on
appeal when he had no warning of the necessity to develop the relevant facts below.
2. Consent/Abandonment
The state, on petition for rehearing, excuses
its failure to raise the issue of standing claiming that neither Mr. Marshall, the state nor
the trial judge focused on the search of the
suitcases in the motion to suppress hearing.
Rather, the state claims the hearing centered
on the pretextual nature of the stop, the unreasonable detention of Mr. Marshall and the
unlawful search of the trunk.
Mr. Marshall, on petition for rehearing,
claims the following comment made by
defense counsel sufficiently focused the proceeding on the search of the suitcases:
"Additionally there is no evidence that there
was consent to search the bags."
Upon a re-examination of the record, we
agree with the state that the parties and the
trial judge did not focus on the critical issue
of the search of the suitcases at the motion to
suppress hearing. The result is that the trial
judge did not make adequate findings of fact
on the issues of voluntary consent to search
the trunk or the suitcases and Mr. Marshall's
alleged abandonment of any privacy interest in
the suitcases, which the parties now agree are
pivotal on appeal. We therefore remand for a
rehearing on these critical issues. We nevertheless discuss the controlling law to guide the
trial court on rehearing.
A search is valid under the fourth amendment if it is conducted as a result of the defendant's voluntary consent. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). *[T]he question [of] whether a consent
to a search was in fact Voluntary* or was the
product of duress or coercion, express or
implied, is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances/
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. "A trial court's
finding of voluntary consent will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous/ United
States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir.

1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979).
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883
(10th Cir. 1977), the Tenth Circuit outlined
the specifics necessary for the government to
sustain its burden to show that voluntary
consent was given:
(1) There must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was
"unequivocal and specific" and
"freely and intelligently given"; (2)
the government must prove consent
was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) the
courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights
and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived.
Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States,
310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962)). See also
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453
(10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State
v. Sierra, ISA P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents
to a search, the ensuing search must be limited
in scope to only the specific area agreed to by
defendant. "The scope of a consent search is
limited by the breadth of the actual consent
itself .... Any police activity that transcends
the actual scope of the consent given encroaches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the
suspect." Umted States v. Gay, 11A F.2d 368,
377 (10th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., People v.
Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope
of consent exceeded when police asked to
"look around" the house, then conducted a 45minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and
closed containers).
The trial court made the following conclusory finding on the issue of Mr. Marshall's
consent: "The Defendant consented to the
search. There was no evidence of duress or
coercion." This conclusory finding on consent
is not particularly helpful in determining
whether Mr. Marshall's consent was
"unequivocal and specific" as it does not detail
what Mr. Marshall agreed could be searched—
the interior of the passenger compartment, the
trunk, or the locked suitcases.10 Furthermore,
the relevant portions from the transcript of
Trooper Avery's testimony are troubling:
Q. [Defense Counsel] What were
the words he [sic] used when you
asked him to search his vehicle?
A. [Trooper Avery] I asked Mr.
Marshall if-if there were anyif there was any-were there any
drugs in the vehicle, and he took
two or three seconds-no, wait a
minute, I guess-I first asked him
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if he was carrying any weapons and
he told me no. I then asked him if
he was carrying any~if there was
any alcohol in the vehicle, he said
that he did not drink. I recall both
answers were quite quick. And then
I asked him if there were any drugs
in the vehicle, he paused for, you
know, probably two or three
seconds, and then told me no. I
then asked him if it would be okay
if I looked in the vehicle, search the
vehicle, an^he said go ahead.
Q. Now, aid you ask if you could
look in the vehicle, or did you ask
if you could search the vehicle?
A. Well, according to this [his
report], I said-I asked if I could
look in the vehicle.
Q. So, it was "look in the vehicle"?
You didn't ask if you could open
anything inside the vehicle or anything else, did you?
A. No. I just asked if I could look
in the vehicle.
Q. And what happened then?
A. Mr. Marshall just told me, you
know, he said go right ahead. He
got out, gathered up his papers and
we walked up to the front of the
vehicle, and he had to open the
passenger door, as I recall.

the finding is consistent with the standard
required for a voluntary consent. See United
States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.
1977); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Likewise, the court in
its findings fails to focus on the search of the
locked suitcases and the issues of voluntary
consent or abandonment.
Even if we were to accept the state's argument that the undisputed facts support a
finding that Mr. Marshall abandoned11 any
expectation of privacy in the suitcases by his
ambiguous disclaimer of ownership and that
the state should be allowed to raise this fourth
amendment standing issue for the first time on
appeal, we would be unable to dispose of this
case on the record before us. The state, in its
petition for rehearing, correctly points out that
"a loss of standing to challenge a search
cannot be brought about by illegal police
conduct." United States v. Labat, 696 F.
Supp. 1419,1425 (D. Kan. 1988).
Thus, we would have to determine if the
search of the trunk was illegal or was a result
of a voluntary consent. This we cannot do on
the record before us.
Even if we determined the search of the
trunk was unlawful, the "defendant must show
a nexus between the allegedly unlawful police
conduct and the abandonment of the property." Id. at 1426. See, e.g., United States v.
Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th Or. 1982), cert,
denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (While *an unconstitutional seizure or arrest which prompts a
Q. And how did you get in the
disclaimer of property vitiates that act," id. at
trunk?
1045, the court found the defendant's disclaA. I asked him, I said-asked
imer was not precipitated by improper
him if he had the key to the trunk
conduct. Id. at 1048.); United States v.
and he says yes, and I says-and
Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Or. 1982)
I asked him if he'[d] open it, which
("There must be a nexus between the allegedly
he did, he tried. He was extremely
unlawful police conduct and abandonment of
nervous at the time. I property if the challenged evidence is to be
Q. So did you open the trunk?
suppressed."); United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d
A. No, sir, I did not. He-he
726, 730 (5th Cir. 1979) (if there is a nexus
could not-there was a little latch
between unlawful police conduct and the disover the key hole. He was shaking
covery of evidence, the court should suppress
so hard, he couldn't even hold the
the evidence). See generally Search and
latch open, so I held the latch up
Seizure: What Constitutes Abandonment of
for him so he could insert the key.
Without the assistance of specific findings Personal Property within Rule that Search and
of fact, we cannot resolve the difficult issue of Seizure of Abandoned Property Is Not Unrewhether , Mr. Marshall's opening the trunk asonable-Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381
constituted implied consent to search the trunk (1985). Again, there is no. finding on this
under the totality of the circumstances prese- crucial issue.
Therefore, we reverse and remand this intnted. See United States v. Almand, 565 F.2d
927, 930 (5th Or.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. S24 erlocutory appeal for a rehearing on Mr.
(1978) (voluntary consent found where defe- Marshall's motion to suppress on the limited
ndant silently reached into his pocket, issues of whether Mr. Marshall voluntarily
removed key, then unlocked and opened consented to the search of the trunk or the
suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall abandoned
camper door).
Furthermore, the record creates a substan- any privacy interest in the suitcases and thus
tial question as to whether the court's general lacks standing to challenge their search, and
finding that there was "no evidence of duress finally, if the trial .court finds there Jwas an
or coercion" was intended to apply to the illegal search **©f ?the trunk. lor suitcases,
search of the trunk or, even if it was, whether whether there is & sufficient nexus'between
that illegal search'and Mr. Marshall's abanUTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

d o n m e n t , if any, of his expectation of privacy
in the suitcases.
Judith M . Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Richard C . Davidson, Judge
N o r m a n H . Jackson, J u d g e
•This opinion issued on Petition for Rehearing
replaces the opinion of the same n a m e issued
o n December 26, 1989.
1. Utah appellate courts have consistently required
detailed findings of fact to support a judgment
entered by a trial judge in civil cases, ^cker
v.
Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979) ("The
importance of complete, accurate and consistent
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential
to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of
law. To that end the findings should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached."); Sampson v.
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (findings of fact must indicate the "mind of
the court." (quoting Parks v. Zions First Nat'l
Bank, 673 P.2d 590,601 (Utah 1983)).
Detailed findings of fact likewise greatly ease the
burden of an appellate court in its review of a trial
court's decision on a motion to suppress. This is
particularly true where multiple issue are presented
in the motion to suppress. 4 W. LaFave, Search &
Seizure §11.2, at 252 (1987) [hereinafter "LaFave"!
(citing State v. Johnson, 16 Or. App. 560, 519 P.2d
1053, 1058-59 (1974)). Many jurisdictions require
specific findings of fact on all motions to suppress.
See LaFave at §11.2 n.188. We believe the requirement a sound one.
2. While the warning citation does not specify which
provision of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated,
the state asserts that his conduct was in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-117(1) (1988) which,
with our emphasis, provides:
It is a misdemeanor for any person to
drive or move or for the owner to cause
or knowingly permit to be driven or
moved on any highway any vehicle or
combination of vehicles which is in such
unsafe condition as to endanger any
person, or which does not contain those
parts or is not at all times equipped with
lamps and other equipment in proper
condition and adjustment....
3. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61
(1979), the United States Supreme Court stated that
an officer has a duty in the interest of highway
safety to stop vehicles for safety reasons. "Many
violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements
are observable, and something can be done about
them by the observing officer, directly and immediately." Id. at 660. The Court inferred that as long
as an officer suspects the driver is violating "any
one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations," the police officer may legally
stop the vehicle. Id. at 661. See Townsel v. State,
763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court
held stop justified when vehicle's headlight was out,
a tail light was broken, the license plate and
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v.
Puig, 112 Ariz. 519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975)

(suspicion of defective turn signals justified stop);
State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 1989) (stop
justified when blinking headlights led officer to stop
vehicle for safety reasons).
4. We do not analyze this issue under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as the state
constitutional issue was not sufficiently particularized below nor is a reasoned analysis provided on
appeal as to why our analysis should be different
under Utah's constitution. See State v. Johnson,
111 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
5. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had
probable cause to search either the car or the suitcases. We, therefore, need not deal with the troublesome issue of whether probable cause to search an
automobile is sufficient under the automobile exception to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk
of a car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982) (if probable cause exists, police can
search closed containers found in vehicle); Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (warrantless search
of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi invalid);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the
trunk of a vehicle invalid); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d
264, 272 n.l (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately) (criticizing the Ross holding).
6. Prior to Schlosser, the Utah Supreme Court had,
in several cases, considered standing for the first
time on appeal and had utilized the doctrine to
refuse to consider the constitutional validity of a
challenged search. See, e.g., State v. Constantino,
732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)
(court did not address whether the issue of standing
had been raised below, but stated that defendant
could not assert any expectation of privacy in
vehicle because he did not own vehicle and had
presented no testimony that he had permission of
owner or had borrowed vehicle "under circumstances that would imply permissive use"); State v.
Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1986) (State
below argued there was consent by defendant's exwife to search his mother's trailer. On appeal, the
state argued defendant had no possessory or proprietary interest in the trailer and thus had no expectation of privacy. The court declined to reach the
issue of consent because it found that defendant
lacked standing to object to the search because the
stipulated evidence did not show that defendant
shared ownership, use or possession of the trailer.);
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984)
(At trial, the defendant produced evidence that
neither the attache case in which the evidence was
found nor the vehicle belonged to the defendant.
The court did not address whether the issue of standing was raised below, but declined to reach the
question of the validity of the search because the
defendant conceded he did not own the case or the
vehicle and had failed to show any expectation of
privacy.). In these earlier cases, it is sometimes
unclear whether the Utah Supreme Court raised the
issue of standing sua sponte on appeal or permitted
the state to raise the issue of standing for the first
time on appeal. We assume that Schlosser supercedes these earlier cases and thus do not follow them.
7. Although the Utah Supreme Court refused to
allow standing to be utilized to attack the trial
court's granting of a motion to suppress in Schlosser, the court relied on State v. Goodman, 42
Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), which held
the state could not raise the issue of standing for the
first time on appeal to provide an alternative ground
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for sustaining the trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress. Id. at 1060.
8. However, the failure of the state to challenge Mr.
Marshall's standing at the suppression hearing did
not give Mr. Marshall an opportunity to assert his
expectation of privacy. See Combs v. United States,
408 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1972) (per curiam) (Where
petitioner's failure to assert an expectation of
privacy may have been explained by the Government's failure to challenge standing either at the
suppression hearing or at trial, the United States
Supreme Court remanded to the district court for
further proceedings to allow petitioner to establish a
privacy interest.).
9. The defendant's testimony at the motion to
suppress hearing cannot be used against the defendant at trial. See Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (prosecutor cannot use a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing as
substantive evidence of guilt at trial unless defendant makes no objection). We note, however, that
the United States Supreme Court had not decided
whether the Simmons rule precludes the use of a
defendant's suppression hearing testimony to
impeach the defendant's testimony at trial. See
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 94 & n.9
(1980).
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the importance of detailed findings on
a motion to suppress.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169,
1173 (10th Cir. 1983) (Court found abandonment
when police initially saw defendant running with a
brown satchel, however, when they captured defendant, he did not have the satchel and disavowed
knowledge of it. Police later found the satchel
outside the building and searched it.); United States
v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982) (court found abandonment where the defendant, after picking up the
luggage at the claim area, produced a mismatched
baggage claim check, told agents that his name was
not on the luggage name tag, and allowed the agents
to return the luggage to the claim area, thus giving
the agents the impression that he had no interest in
the luggage); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d
1217, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456
U.S. 946 (1982) (court found abandonment where
the defendant disclaimed ownership of a wallet
found on the seat of the vehicle); United States v.
Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc)
(court found abandonment when defendants disclaimed ownership of suitcases and began to walk
away from them).
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BILLINGS, Judge:
Plaintiffs/appellants Carl N. Smith and
Dawna LaVerne Smith ("Smiths*) appeal from
a money judgment in their favor. The Smiths
claim the trial court incorrectly assessed the
damages due them as a result of the defendant/
appellee Linmar Energy Corporation's
("Linmar Energy") placement of an oil well,
battery storage tank, and road on the Smiths'
property pursuant to an oil and gas lease. We
affirm.
The Smiths are owners of a fee interest in
20 acres of land located adjacent to the city
limits of Altamont in Duchesne County.
Linmar Energy is the lessee under an oil and
gas lease covering this property. The Smiths'
20-acre tract, including the land now occupied by the well site, has been used exclusively
for agricultural purposes. The Smiths' property is located in the Altamont-Bluebell oil
field and is surrounded by numerous oil wells,
some of which may be seen from the Smith
property.
In 1983,' Linmar 'Energy, pursuant to its
lease, entered onto the southwest corner of the
Smiths' 20-acre parcel to install an oil well
along with an oil well battery and storage
tanks. Linmar Energy also constructed an
access road from the .county road on the north
to the well site. Linmar Energy occupied 4.76
acres of the 20-acre parcel.
Linmar Energy,, considered several other
alternative locations for the well site, but rejected the other sites based on geological "and
economic factors. Prior to construction of the
well site, Linmar Energy^ representative
contacted Carl Smith and inet him on the
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